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The emergence of a new actor, the Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP), upset 
the balance of forces in Turkey at the 
turn of the millennium. In the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, the 
main opposition was organized by the 
Welfare Party (RP), which ran on a plat-
form of social justice, anti-Westernism, 
and Islamic morality. After the secu-
larist military closed this party down 
twice, a new generation of leaders split 
to form the AKP. They received a warm 
welcome from liberals, business circles, 
and the West, to whom they promised 
market reforms and democratization.
Neo-liberal democratization
The rigid secularist bureaucrats and middle classes remained incred-
ulous; they feared a gradual transformation to an Islamic regime when 
the AKP came to power in 2002 with the support of the business class, 
the media, religious communities, the USA, and the EU. Yet, four and a 
half years of AKP rule were marked by extensive privatization and lim-
ited democratization, rather than Islamization. The Turkish economy 
grew steadily, while inequalities rose sharply. The ruling party empha-
sized democratization, but tended to restrict this with the needs of the 
market.
Between 2002 and 2006, torture declined. The government granted 
the Kurds the right to receive private education in their own language. 
Turkey’s ratings in human rights indices improved. These steps, along 
with economic reforms, sent the global business world the image of 
a liberalizing country. Foreign capital flowed in. However, the govern-
ment took no concrete steps to integrate the Kurds into the system. 
The 10% election barrier, which kept Kurdish nationalist parties out of 
the parliament for years, is still in force. The major legal Kurdish organi-
zation (Democratic Society Party, DTP) received severe blows in the first 
months of 2007. During the same year, the government itself made at-
tempts to overturn some reforms concerning the Kurds, under pressure 
from the Army. The AKP cooperated with the secularist CHP (Republi-
can People’s Party) to erect yet other institutional impediments in the 
way of a DTP success at the polls in 2007.
More important for the markets, the AKP government crushed strikes 
and Prime Minister Erdoğan labelled any popular resistance against 
privatization as “communist.” On May Day 2007, the Istanbul Governor 
and the police heavily cracked down on demonstrators. Zaman, the 
newspaper of a pro-AKP religious community, even called for military 
action against the non-violent demonstrators.
Finally, the willingness of the top AKP leaders to participate in West-
ern military action against Middle East countries, despite strong pub-
lic opinion, bolstered the image of the government as pro-Western,1 
thereby making the country even more attractive for Western transna-
tional capital. At the same time, transactions with Muslim countries 
also increased, as the ruling party converted its Islamist past into new 
business ties. In sum, the AKP government pursued democratization 
and Islam in so far as they served the country’s integration with world 
markets.
In the absence of democratic mass forces, all the social ills that neo-
liberal democratization fostered led to the public questioning of de-
mocracy rather than a criticism of neo-liberalization. The resulting trend 
of authoritarianism was also due to disappointment with EU accession. 
In the last several years, the AKP enacted major democratic reforms 
also as a part of the EU accession process. European reluctance regard-
ing Turkish membership despite the reforms increased the number 
of anti-EU nationalists in the country. 
The nationalists perceive especially 
the Kurdish reforms as intended to 
first weaken, and then to partition Tur-
key, in line with alleged European and 
American desires.
Nationalist mobilization
In April 2007, Turkey witnessed its 
history’s biggest rallies. Hundreds of 
thousands gathered in many major cit-
ies against the possibility that the next 
Turkish president could have a veiled 
wife. Izmir, the pinnacle, boasted a 
total of one million demonstrators. Yet, 
the veil was not the only item on the agenda of the secularist organ-
izers. Actually, the government had taken only timid steps towards in-
creasing the role of Islam. Together with this concern about moderate 
Islamization, the rallies also raised issues about the government’s pro-
market and democratic reforms. The Ataturkist Thought Association 
(ADD), one of the two primary organizers of the events, emphasized its 
stance against the “global exploitation system” and Turkey’s increasing 
foreign debt in its call for the event. Despite this apparent social justice 
orientation of the organizers, Turkey’s major unions did not support 
the rallies, publicly announcing that they would not be on the same 
side with “coup-mongers.”
As the union leaders hinted, the ADD is a part of a network of civil 
society organizations and political parties which have been resisting 
democratic reforms. This network includes the CHP as well as smaller 
secularist parties, associations of nationalist professionals, and some 
paramilitary nationalist groups. All of these organizations are worried 
about pro-Kurdish reforms of the government, its dialogue with Arme-
nians, its liberal policies regarding Cyprus, its privatization of natural 
resources and strategic public companies, and what they perceive to 
be the increasing salience of Islam in Turkey. Some of them have called 
for more military involvement in the regime. The Turkish press has 
uncovered evidence about the nationalist paramilitary organizations’ 
involvement in several assassinations, including the slaying of the Ar-
menian journalist Hrant Dink. 
Dink’s killing was a link in a series of nationalist murders in 2006 and 
2007, which targeted intellectuals, activists, and missionaries seen as 
agents of the West. This ferocious campaign, coupled with the rallies, 
raised concern among Turkish intellectuals regarding the possibility of 
a fascist regime. Indeed, as several analysts pointed out, the parallels 
with historical fascist mobilization are striking. The nationalist organi-
zations tap into a popular feeling of national humiliation at the hands 
of the European Union, just like interwar fascisms erupted after mili-
tary and diplomatic defeats. They are fiercely against the government’s 
“concessions” to minorities. They voice the fears of some middle class 
sectors and soldiers who find themselves jammed between global cap-
italism on the one hand, and Kurdish and Islamic movements on the 
other. Fascisms of yesteryear similarly gave voice to the middle classes 
squeezed between big business and militant working class move-
ments. Similar to classical fascism, the new nationalism in Turkey com-
bines social justice rhetoric with nationalist authoritarianism. Maybe 
more important than anything else, the nationalist organizations are 
all fired up over the possibility of an independent Kurdish state, and 
want the military to intervene in Northern Iraq, using Lebensraum-like 
arguments. Just like in interwar Europe, the main leaders of these para-
military organizations are retired soldiers. Finally, as in interwar Italy, 
many of the top leaders are also converts from the socialist left. These 
ex-socialists are dismayed with the democratization and internationali-
Turkey is going through hard times. 
The  bastion  of secularism in the Middle 
East is forced to make a choice between the 
hand of the market and the boot of the army. 
The AKP’s conservatives gain momentum by 
building Islamic and liberal consent for the 
market option. The opposition, aligned behind 
the army and nationalist parties, lacks a clear 
economic alternative, while it mobilizes around 
anti-market and anti-Islamist slogans. The  
electorate heavily weighed on the side of the 
market in July 2007. Yet, the military and its 
allies still threaten to destabilize the AKP’s neo-
liberal democratization.
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and more links of the military with political murders and paramilitary 
organizations. Also, pro-AKP sources revealed that the Turkish military 
was consulting with neo-con think tanks in the U.S., discussing bloody 
conspiracies to thwart the AKP government. After these dark dealings 
of the military were made public, the nationalist mobilization lost mo-
mentum. The June rallies that the generals had incited could gather 
only a few thousand people. In the meantime, the liberal think tanks in 
the U.S. started to openly support the AKP. The party also gave a posi-
tive message to Washington by liquidating the (ex-Islamist) members 
of parliament who had voted against letting the Americans use Tur-
key’s borders for attacking Iraq.
Self-defeating anti-imperialism 
After the invasion of Iraq, there was a sharp anti-American turn in 
public opinion in Turkey. The nationalist parties used this public sen-
timent as a weapon against the AKP, and after 2003 politics shaped 
around taking the right position with respect to the U.S. Yet, the real 
issue in Turkey is not a choice between pro-Americanism or anti-
Americanism, as recent developments demonstrated. Different wings 
of the Turkish ruling bloc have been negotiating with different wings 
of the American elite, whether overtly or covertly. The Army itself ap-
peared anti-American and thus appealed to street-level anti-imperi-
alism, while working with the U.S. In this contradictory atmosphere, 
more anti-imperialism led to more American control. For the first time 
in Turkish history, the battles between American think tanks were in 
the centre of Turkish politics and public debate. The new wave of na-
tionalism was strengthening the imperialism it claimed to be fighting 
against.
The secularists’ shallow anti-imperialism eventually backfired: as a 
reaction against the authoritarianism of the secularists, a wide array of 
forces (liberals, Islamists, conservatives) united their forces at the ballot 
on July 22. The AKP increased its votes from 34% to 46% in four and a half 
years. More interestingly, the AKP nearly doubled 
its votes in the Kurdish southeast despite its slug-
gish human rights record. About half of the Kurdish 
population gave the message that it counts on the 
pro-American (and potentially pro-Barzani) foreign 
policies of the party rather than on the guerrilla-
supported DTP’s secular nationalism.
EU representatives, the Western financial press, 
and Western governments enthusiastically ap-
plauded the victory. But so did Middle Eastern 
governments and Islamist newspapers world-
wide. When the AKP’s foreign minister Abdullah 
Gül officially declared on August 13 that he was 
still the party’s presidential candidate, both Eu-
ropean and Turkish liberals, and local Islamists 
were jubilant; the former interpreted this step 
as a guarantee that Turkey would stick to demo-
cratic reforms, while the latter saw this as an au-
gury of coming Islamization. The success of the 
AKP lies in being able to cash such combined 
democratic and Islamic support into market re-
forms. For example, immediately after its elec-
tion victory, the party signalled that it is going 
to change the constitution to allow the privatiza-
tion of lakes and rivers. 
However, the game is not over yet. Kurdish nationalist politicians entered 
the July elections as independent candidates to overcome the 10 per cent 
barrier. Now, there is a strong DTP contingent in the parliament. The mili-
tary and its allies are likely to use Kurdish nationalism, the yet unresolved 
presidential crisis, and the spectre of Islamization as excuses to take anti-
democratic steps. Given Turkey’s present political cartography, there is no 
concrete alternative against neo-liberalism, but authoritarian actors still 
have the power to destabilize market reforms. 
zation of the Turkish left. The new nationalists fight these “aberrations” 
by building purified organizations to which non-Turks are not allowed.
However, all of this does not mean that a fascist takeover is immi-
nent. There is currently no Duce who can turn this loose network of 
nationalist organizations into a single fascist party. Attempts to forge 
a grand coalition of secular nationalists (the Kemalists) and more reli-
giously oriented extreme nationalists (the Grey Wolves of the National-
ist Action Party, MHP) have so far failed. The Kemalist perception of the 
Grey Wolves as religious fanatics prone to senseless murder prevents 
any smooth coalition of all nationalist forces. This perception emanates 
both from Kemalists’ secular elitism and from the grey wolves’ murder 
record in the 1970s. Moreover, what combined millions in the rallies 
was by no means a clearly defined racist ideology, even though the 
paramilitary groups have been circulating racist documents for a while. 
Finally, as different from interwar fascisms that had a clear corporatist 
alternative to liberal capitalism and socialism, the nationalists of Tur-
key have no well-defined economic programme beyond an anti-neo-
liberal rhetoric. Hence, there is (as of yet) no united political will that 
can thoroughly transform Turkey in a fascist direction. 
What seems more possible is a decisive shift in the direction of an 
authoritarian regime. In that regard, the mobilization succeeded only 
partially. Ever since mid-April, the military has been intervening in 
politics via ultimatums, both supporting and being supported by the 
nationalist street. Taking its lead from the rallies and a military ultima-
tum, the Constitutional Court cancelled presidential elections. The na-
tionalists thereby initially succeeded in blocking a veiled, neo-liberal 
presidency.
Two campaigns: chauvinism and demilitarization
Both the neo-liberals and the nationalists centred on the July elec-
tions to resolve the presidential crisis. The election campaigns shaped 
up as a competition between extreme nationalism and democratiza-
tion (bounded by neo-liberalism). While the only 
major representative of the second option was 
the AKP, the CHP, the MHP, and the Young Party 
(GP) competed for nationalist votes. Along with 
anti-Islamism and anti-liberalism, the national-
ist parties built their platform on the widespread 
worry that the federal structure of Iraq is not sus-
tainable. Northern Iraq would inevitably become 
an independent Kurdish state, they believed. An 
independent Kurdistan, in turn, would lead to the 
demise of the Turkish Republic, as the Kurds in 
Turkey would eventually split and join their breth-
ren in the south. 
The military chief Büyükanıt publicly asked the 
government to send the military into Iraq, both to 
stop attacks by the Kurdish guerrilla positioned in 
Northern Iraq and to prevent the formation of an 
independent Kurdish State. The AKP responded 
by announcing that it did not receive any official 
request from the military. The major nationalist 
parties and media channels held the government 
responsible for dragging its feet regarding an 
operation. In the weeks before the elections, the 
visual media and the press drummed up public 
support for operations in roundabout ways. One 
example was the unusual airtime devoted to funeral ceremonies of 
soldiers killed by the guerrilla. The top generals as well as AKP minis-
ters joined these funerals, along with thousands of people. Nationalist 
crowds chanted in favour of the generals and booed the ministers. 
In this atmosphere, it would be difficult for any political party to pro-
tect the democratic reforms, let alone pass new ones. The AKP itself 
gave in to pressures by reversing some of the reforms (e.g. by expand-
ing police capacities against “terrorism”). Today, torture is again on the 
rise in Turkey. Counter-insurgency in the southeast already has a lot 
of street support behind it, and the army has been asking for more. 
In early June 2007, Büyükanıt demanded mass reactions “against ter-
rorism.” 
Nevertheless, the AKP’s hands were not tied in the face of this cam-
paign. While avoiding any public confrontation with the military, the 
ruling party indirectly undermined the military’s authority. Closer to 
the elections, the conservative police forces started to uncover more 
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it claimed to be 
fighting against.
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